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Processing of Spontaneous Emotional Responses in Adolescents and
Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders: Effect of Stimulus Type
Sarah Cassidy, Peter Mitchell, Peter Chapman, and Danielle Ropar
Recent research has shown that adults with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have difficulty interpreting others’ emo-
tional responses, in order to work out what actually happened to them. It is unclear what underlies this difficulty;
important cues may be missed from fast paced dynamic stimuli, or spontaneous emotional responses may be too
complex for those with ASD to successfully recognise. To explore these possibilities, 17 adolescents and adults with
ASD and 17 neurotypical controls viewed 21 videos and pictures of peoples’ emotional responses to gifts (chocolate, a
handmade novelty or Monopoly money), then inferred what gift the person received and the emotion expressed by
the person while eye movements were measured. Participants with ASD were significantly more accurate at distinguish-
ing who received a chocolate or homemade gift from static (compared to dynamic) stimuli, but significantly less accu-
rate when inferring who received Monopoly money from static (compared to dynamic) stimuli. Both groups made
similar emotion attributions to each gift in both conditions (positive for chocolate, feigned positive for homemade and
confused for Monopoly money). Participants with ASD only made marginally significantly fewer fixations to the eyes of
the face, and face of the person than typical controls in both conditions. Results suggest adolescents and adults with
ASD can distinguish subtle emotion cues for certain emotions (genuine from feigned positive) when given sufficient
processing time, however, dynamic cues are informative for recognising emotion blends (e.g. smiling in confusion).
This indicates difficulties processing complex emotion responses in ASD. Autism Res 2015, 8: 534–544. VC 2015 The
Authors Autism Research published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of International Society for Autism Research
Keywords: autism spectrum disorders; face perception; eye tracking; spontaneous emotion recognition; retrodictive
mindreading; social cognition; multi-modal processing; visual auditory integration
Introduction
Although current diagnostic criteria for autism spec-
trum disorders (ASD) includes difficulties interpreting
other’s emotions and responding appropriately (APA,
2013), emotion processing difficulties in ASD have not
been consistently demonstrated (Gaigg, 2012; Harms,
Martin, & Wallace, 2010; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013).
Recent research suggests that the type of emotion
expressions presented, and judgements made by partici-
pants in these studies do not match the demands of
everyday life, where individuals with ASD are more likely
to experience difficulties (Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell, &
Chapman, 2014). To understand the nature of the diffi-
culties individuals with ASD experience, we must utilise
tasks that match the demands of everyday life.
To accomplish this, Cassidy et al. (2014) developed a
task to explore emotion processing in realistic social
situations. Participants are presented with a person’s
spontaneous emotional response to a social situation
(receiving a wanted or unwanted gift), and subse-
quently gauge the person’s emotional response to infer
what actually happened to them (what gift did they
receive?). This ability has been termed Retrodictive
Mindreading, and may be the most common form of
emotion processing in everyday life (Millikan, 2005).
Results showed that although adults with ASD under-
stood what emotions were appropriate to each situation
to the same extent as typical controls (e.g. feigning a
positive response to an unwanted gift), they had diffi-
culty interpreting subtle emotional responses, (genuine
and feigned positive), but not confused, which was rec-
ognised to a similar level to typical controls.
It is unclear how individuals with ASD process the
spontaneous emotional responses we typically encoun-
ter in everyday life. Spontaneous emotional responses
are subtle, can show more than one emotion, and are
subject to display rules, such as trying to show a posi-
tive, as opposed to a negative fac¸ade to a social interac-
tion partner (Carroll & Russell, 1997; Matsumoto &
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Willingham, 2006; Matsumoto, Olide, Schug, Willing-
ham, & Callan, 2009; O’Sullivan, 1982). Thus, sponta-
neous expressions have lower signal clarity than posed
expressions, which tend to portray one emotion at a
high intensity (Matsumoto et al., 2009). Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, studies of typically developing adults
have shown that spontaneous expressions are harder to
recognise than posed expressions (Hoque & Picard,
2011; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Naab & Russell, 2007; Wag-
ner, 1990; Wagner, Lewis, Ramsay, & Krediet, 1992;
Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead, 1986).
Studies of emotion processing in ASD have predomi-
nantly used posed expressions showing a single emo-
tion (e.g. Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Corden,
Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008; Eack, Mazefsky, & Minshew, in
press; Enticott et al., 2014; Ogai et al., 2003). These
studies typically fail to find emotion processing difficul-
ties in adolescents and adults with high functioning
ASD (Gaigg 2012; Harms et al., 2010; Uljarevic & Ham-
ilton, 2013), despite their difficulties interpreting emo-
tions in everyday life (APA, 2013). This disparity
between results in the lab and experience in the real
world could be because the stimuli typically used (static
posed expressions) have higher signal clarity than the
spontaneous expressions encountered in everyday life.
This theory is supported by studies showing that indi-
viduals with ASD have difficulties interpreting emotions
of low intensity (Law Smith et al., 2010), blends of two
emotions (Humphreys, Minshew, Leonard, & Behr-
mann, 2007), distinguishing genuine from feigned emo-
tion responses (Boraston, Corden, Miles, Skuse, &
Blakemore, 2008; Cassidy et al., 2014), and interpreting
what happened to a person from their behaviour (Pillai
et al., 2014). These studies suggest that adolescents and
adults with ASD require a higher level of signal clarity
than typical controls to successfully interpret emotions.
Another important component of emotional
responses in everyday life is that they are dynamic,
which individuals with ASD may have difficulty proc-
essing (Gepner & Feron, 2009). For example, children
with ASD are better able to infer emotion from videos
when slowed down (Gepner, Deruelle, & Grynfeltt,
2001; Tardif, Laine, Rodriguez, & Gepner, 2007), and
adults with ASD are better able to infer complex emo-
tions (such as guilt) from static photos of the eye region
of faces, than from a video of a social interaction
(Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001). However,
adults with ASD only showed difficulty inferring certain
prototypical emotions (i.e. sad) from dynamic (com-
pared to static) stimuli and were significantly better at
inferring anger from dynamic (compared to static) stim-
uli (Enticott et al., 2014).
Difficulties processing dynamic stimuli could be due
to those with ASD missing pertinent social cues. For
example, those with ASD show delays in fixating
socially pertinent information in static pictures of social
scenes, such as people and the eyes of faces (Fletcher-
Watson, Leekam, Benson, Frank, & Findlay, 2009;
Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Findlay, & Stanton, 2008;
Freeth, Ropar, Chapman, & Mitchell, 2010a, 2010b).
This impacts processing of dynamic stimuli, which
tends to reveal overall differences in visual fixation pat-
terns in adolescents and adults with ASD (Klin, Jones,
Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Speer, Cook, McMa-
hon, & Clark, 2007).
Although it appears that individuals with ASD have
difficulty processing spontaneous emotional expressions
due to their low signal clarity and fast paced dynamic
cues, these factors have not been explored using spon-
taneous emotional responses. To explore these possibil-
ities, we utilise the same task reported in Cassidy et al.
(2014) under two conditions; the original videos of peo-
ples’ emotional responses, and static pictures of the
peak of the expression presented for as long as partici-
pants need to judge the person’s emotional response. If
individuals with ASD primarily have difficulty interpret-
ing others’ emotional responses due to missing important
cues from fast paced dynamic stimuli, then we would
expect that freezing these cues for as long as participants
needed would improve their ability to accurately gauge
another’s emotional response. However, if adolescents
and adults with ASD primarily have difficulty interpreting
others’ emotional responses due to low signal clarity,
then we would expect that freezing the expression for as
long as participants need would not improve their ability
to gauge others’ emotional responses.
We also record participants’ eye movements while
viewing the stimuli, as eye-tracking studies have shown
reduced attention to social information particularly for
dynamic stimuli (e.g. Speer et al., 2007). Thus, we
explore whether individuals with ASD show reduced
attention to the face of the person and eyes of the face
more in the dynamic than the static condition, along-
side increased difficulty interpreting dynamic emotional
responses. If so, then this would further suggest that
individuals with ASD have difficulty interpreting spon-
taneous emotional responses due to missing pertinent
social cues from fast paced dynamic stimuli.
Method
Participants
The ASD group was comprised of 17 adolescents and
adults (2 female, 15 male) aged 14–21 years, recruited
from specialist schools and colleges for individuals with
ASD across the UK. Two participants in the ASD group
met the recommended cut-off (>32) on the autism
spectrum quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
However, all participants with ASD had been formally
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diagnosed by a clinician according to DSM-IV criteria
(American Psychological Association, 1994) before
being accepted into the specialist school or college. The
control group was comprised of 17 adolescents and
adults (11 female, 6 male) aged 15–19 years, recruited
from mainstream schools and colleges in the East Mid-
lands area, without any diagnosed medical or learning
difficulties. The full Weschler Abbreviated Subscales of
Intelligence (WASI-III) (Wechsler, 1999) was adminis-
tered to all participants. Groups were matched on age
and intelligence quotient (IQ; see Table 1), but not gen-
der (X2(1)510.1, P<0.001). There was no significant
effect of gender on task performance in the control
group.
Materials
The dynamic condition included 21 video clips (rang-
ing from 1.3 to 6 sec in duration). The static condition
included 21 pictures taken from one frame of each
video. Stimuli were presented on the Tobii (1750) eye-
tracker in high definition (192031080i). Eye move-
ments were recorded using Tobii Studio at a rate of 50
recordings per second.
Stimuli Development
Dynamic stimuli. Full details of the stimuli set are
available in Cassidy et al. (2014). There were twenty-
one videos of people reacting to receiving a gift (a box
of chocolates, a homemade novelty or a wad of
Monopoly money) from the experimenter in exchange
for staying behind after completing a long unrelated
task. There were seven video-taped reactions to each
gift, which included verbal cues, varying in duration
from 1.3 to 6 sec in length.
Static stimuli. One frame of each video clip was
chosen by the researchers for use in the current study.
This was judged by extracting the frame at the peak of
the person’s expression; after they had seen the gift,
and their face had fully formed their reaction. Four
independent judges rated whether the static picture
chosen by the researcher represented the peak of the
expression shown in the video. Cohen’s Kappa showed
a high level of agreement between judges (K50.86).
These pictures were extracted in full colour high defini-
tion format using Final Cut Pro.
Procedure
Participants took part in two sessions separated by a
period of 2–4 weeks to reduce the possibility of carry-
over effects between the two conditions. In each ses-
sion, participants were presented with video clips or
static pictures while eye movements were recorded. The
order of testing sessions was fully counterbalanced. Par-
ticipants were given an information sheet about the
study and asked to give their consent to take part. Par-
ticipants sat in a comfortable chair approximately
40 cm from the eye-tracking screen. A six-point calibra-
tion was conducted before the start of the experiment
and participants were asked to remain as still as possible
throughout the experiment to prevent any deteriora-
tion in calibration.
Participants were told that they would see 21 videos
or static pictures of people receiving either a box of
chocolates, a wad of monopoly money or a hand-made
gift in exchange for doing a big favour for someone.
They were asked to watch each video or picture care-
fully and judge what gift the target had been offered (of
the three options), and state the emotion of the target
on being offered the gift. All responses were verbal and
digitally recorded.
In the dynamic condition, each trial presentation
sequence consisted of a 500 ms blank screen preceding
the video, followed by a fixation cross in the middle of
the screen which participants were asked to fixate on
while they gave their response. In the static condition,
a fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen for
5 sec before the picture appeared. The picture remained
on the screen until the participant answered the test
questions. Then, the experimenter would move onto
the next trial by a key press. All pictures and videos
were presented in random order.
The researcher then asked the participant ‘do you
think the person got a box of chocolates, a tacky glitter
card made especially for them, or some fake money?’
Table 1. Participant Characteristics
ASD group (N5 17) Control group (N5 17)
t-test resultMean6 S.D. (range) Mean6 S.D. (range)
Age (years) 17.36 1.6 (14–21) 17.16 0.9 (15–19) t(32)5 0.4, P5 0.69
Full-scale IQ 92.26 13.6 (74–120) 97.86 6.4 (86–108) t(32)5 1.5, P5 0.14
Verbal IQ 89.66 15.2 (64–115) 96.36 6.2 (85–106) t(32)5 1.7, P5 0.11
Performance IQ 976 13.5 (72–120) 99.26 8 (86–111) t(32)5 0.6, P5 0.58
AQ 22.86 7.7 (11–39) N/A N/A
N.B. AQ score is missing for one participant with ASD.
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The participant was given as much time as they needed
to respond to the test question. After giving a response
the participant was then asked ‘How do you think the
person felt when they got the [participant’s gift
response]?’ After the participant had responded to both
of the test questions, the researcher asked if the partici-
pant was ready and started the next trial by a key press.
Emotion Description Coding
As participants’ estimations of the target’s emotion were
free response, to analyse these data the experimenter used
the same coding scheme as described in Cassidy et al.
(2014), to code participants’ estimations of the recipient’s
emotion as belonging to one of four categories:
Positive: Any label which had a positive connotation;
happy, glad, pleasantly surprised, pleased.
Negative: Any label which had a negative connota-
tion; displeased, unhappy, disappointed, angry, upset.
Pretend: Any label which referred to the participant
concealing negative emotions; hiding disappointment,
fake smile, politely accepting.
Confused: Any label which did not have an explicit
positive or negative connotation. For example, sur-
prised, confused, puzzled, thoughtful.
Results
Behavioural Results
Are individuals with ASD less accurate when
inferring gift in both conditions? Table 2 shows the
confusion matrices for participants’ gift inferences in
the typical control (a) and ASD (b) groups in each con-
dition. In the dynamic condition, both groups perform
comparably for chocolate, making more incorrect than
correct inferences. Only typical controls made more
correct than incorrect responses for a homemade gift,
whereas both groups give more correct than incorrect
responses for Monopoly money. In the static condition,
both groups showed an increase in correct chocolate
responses, and those with ASD an increase in correct
homemade gift responses. However, those with ASD
were less accurate than controls for Monopoly money.
To control for ‘don’t know’ responses, the proportion
of correct gift responses were calculated as the number
of correct responses, divided by the total number of
times a participant offered that gift response (Figs. 1
and 2).
A three way mixed ANOVA compared group (ASD,
typical control), condition (static, dynamic) and per-
centage of correct gift responses (chocolate, homemade
and Monopoly money). There was no significant
effect of condition (F(1,32)50.3, P50.9) or group
(F(1,32)52.4, P50.1). There was a three way interac-
tion between group, condition and gift (F(2,64)57.2,
P<0.001). Simple main effects analysis showed par-
ticipants with ASD were only significantly less accu-
rate than controls when inferring who received
Monopoly money in the static condition (F(1,32)5
8.5, P<0.01).
Does performance improve in the static condi-
tion? Simple main effects analysis showed partici-
pants with ASD were significantly more accurate when
inferring who received a chocolate gift (F(1,32)58.1,
P<0.01), and significantly less accurate when inferring
Table 2. Confusion Matrices Showing Raw Frequencies with which Each Gift was Inferred in Each Condition in the ASD and
Typical Control Groups
Dynamic Condition Static Condition
Correct Answer Correct Answer
Chocolate Homemade Monopoly money Total Chocolate Homemade Monopoly money Total
a) Typical group
Gift response Chocolate 32A 44a 17b 93 54A 33a 19b 106
Homemade 38a 63A 20b 121 37b 41A 34b 112
Monopoly money 45a 6b 72A 123 20b 38a 59A 117
Don’t know 4 6 10 20 8 7 7 22
Total 119 119 119 119 119 119
b) ASD group
Gift Response Chocolate 33A 54a 25b 112 53A 28b 37a 118
Homemade 46a 50A 28b 124 24b 58A 38a 120
Monopoly money 38a 14b 66A 118 42a 30a 43A 115
Don’t know 2 1 0 3 0 3 1 4
Total 119 119 119 119 119 119
Note. Shaded cells denoted by A indicate correct gift inferences. Cells sharing a common subscript letter (a) were not significantly different from
the correct gift response, while subscript letter (b) denotes a significant difference from the correct gift response.
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who received Monopoly money (F(1,32)518.1,
P<0.001) in the static (compared to the dynamic) con-
dition. There was no significant difference in correct
homemade gift inferences between the two conditions
(F(1,32)52.1, P50.1).
The typical control group were significantly more
accurate when inferring who received a chocolate gift
(F(1,32)59.9, P<0.01), and marginally significantly
less accurate when inferring who received a homemade
gift (F(1,32)50.8, P<0.05) in the static (compared to
the dynamic) condition. There was no significant differ-
ence in correct Monopoly money (F(1,32)51.4, P50.2)
inferences between the two conditions.
A two way mixed ANOVA showed that the static pic-
ture was displayed longer in the ASD than the typical
control group (F(1,32)59.8, P<0.01), regardless of gift
type (F(2,64)52, P50.14).
What was the pattern of errors in each group
and condition? Table 2 shows that participants with
ASD confuse reactions to chocolate and homemade less
in the static (compared to the dynamic) condition, and
confuse reactions to Monopoly money with chocolate
and homemade more in the static (compared to the
dynamic) condition. To compare this pattern of errors
between groups and across conditions, a four way
mixed ANOVA was conducted with group as a between
subjects factor with two levels (ASD, typical), condition
as a within subjects factor with two levels (static,
dynamic), correct answer (i.e. what gift the target
received) as a within subjects factor with three levels
(chocolate, homemade and Monopoly money) and par-
ticipants’ response as a within subjects factor with three
levels (chocolate, homemade and Monopoly money).
The four way mixed ANOVA showed a significant inter-
action between group, condition, correct answer and
participants’ gift response (F(4,128)54.1, P<0.01). To
explore this interaction, simple main effects analysis
compared the percentage of correct to incorrect
responses in each condition and group separately, fol-
lowed up with Bonferroni corrected t-tests.
Dynamic Condition
Participants with ASD gave significantly more correct
Monopoly money inferences than incorrect chocolate
(P<0.001) and homemade (P<0.001) inferences
(F(2,31)518.1, P<0.001); significantly more correct
homemade inferences than incorrect Monopoly money
(P<0.01), but not chocolate (P50.9) inferences
(F(2,31)520.7, P<0.001); participants with ASD did
not give significantly more correct chocolate inferences
than incorrect homemade or Monopoly money infer-
ences (F(2,31)50.8, P50.5).
Typical controls gave significantly more correct
Monopoly money inferences than incorrect chocolate
(P<0.001) and homemade (P<0.001) inferences
(F(2,31)526, P<0.001); significantly more correct
homemade inferences than incorrect Monopoly money
(P<0.001), but not chocolate (P51) inferences
(F(2,31)539.3, P<0.001); typical controls did not give
significantly more correct chocolate inferences than
incorrect homemade or Monopoly money inferences
(F(2,31)50.4, P50.7).
Static Condition
Participants with ASD did not give significantly more
correct Monopoly money inferences than incorrect
chocolate or homemade inferences (F(2,31)50.01,
Figure 1. Percentage correct gift inferences in the ASD and
typical group in the static condition. Horizontal line denotes
chance level of 33%.
Figure 2. Percentage of correct gift inferences for the ASD
and typical group in the dynamic condition. Horizontal line
denotes chance level of 33%.
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P50.9). Participants with ASD gave significantly more
correct homemade inferences than incorrect chocolate
inferences (P<0.05), but not incorrect Monopoly
money (P50.053) inferences (F(2,31)54.3, P<0.05);
and significantly more correct chocolate inferences
than incorrect homemade inferences (P<0.01), but not
incorrect Monopoly money (P51) inferences (F(2,31)5
7.1, P<0.01).
Typical controls gave significantly more correct
Monopoly money inferences than incorrect chocolate
(P<0.001) and homemade (P<0.01) inferences
(F(2,31)511.1, P<0.001); significantly more correct
chocolate inferences than incorrect homemade
(P<0.05) and incorrect Monopoly money (P<0.001)
inferences (F(2,31)513.3, P<0.001); but not signifi-
cantly more correct homemade inferences than
Table 3. Frequency of Emotion Ratings for Correct Gift Inferences in the ASD and Typical Group, in the Static and Dynamic
Conditions
Dynamic condition Static condition
Correct gift response (expected frequencies in
brackets)
Correct gift response (expected frequencies in
brackets)
Chocolate Homemade Monopoly money Total Chocolate Homemade Monopoly money Total
a) Typical group
Emotion Positive 30A (14.75) 45 (29.05) 2 (33.2) 77 47A (26.65) 22 (20.23) 7 (29.12) 76
Pretend 0 (1.34) 6A (2.64) 1 (3.02) 7 0 (1.05) 3A (0.8) 0 (1.15) 3
Confused 1 (12.65) 9 (24.9) 56A (28.45) 66 3 (16.13) 10 (12.25) 33A (17.62) 46
Negative 1 (2.87) 1 (5.66) 13 (6.47) 15 0 (7.36) 3 (5.59) 18 (8.04) 21
Don’t know 0 (0.38) 2 (0.75) 0 (0.86) 2 4 (2.8) 3 (2.13) 1 (3.06) 8
Total 32 63 72 167 54 41 59 154
b) ASD group
Emotion Positive 29A (15.95) 32 (24.16) 11 (31.89) 72 50A (28.91) 25 (31.64) 9 (23.45) 84
Pretend 0 (2.21) 6A (3.36) 4 (4.43) 10 0 (1.72) 4A (1.88) 1 (1.4) 5
Confused 4 (11.07) 7 (16.78) 39A (22.15) 50 2 (15.14) 22 (16.57) 20A (12.29) 44
Negative 0 (2.88) 3 (4.36) 10 (5.76) 13 0 (5.16) 4 (5.65) 11 (4.19) 15
Don’t know 0 (0.89) 2 (1.34) 2 (1.77) 4 1 (2.06) 3 (2.26) 2 (1.67) 6
Total 33 50 66 149 53 58 43 154
Note. Frequencies with subscript A denote correct gift and consistent emotion inference.
Table 4. Frequency of Emotion Ratings for Incorrect Gift Inferences in the ASD and Typical Group, in the Static and Dynamic
Conditions
Dynamic condition Static Condition
Incorrect gift response (Expected frequencies in
brackets)
Incorrect gift response (Expected frequencies in
brackets)
Chocolate Homemade Monopoly money Don’t know Total Chocolate Homemade Monopoly money Don’t know Total
a) Typical group
Emotion Positive 51A (24.72) 21 (23.5) 5 (20.67) 0 (8.1) 77 46A (26.38) 35 (36.02) 21 (29.43) 1 (11.16) 103
Pretend 0 (1.28) 3A (1.22) 1 (1.07) 0 (0.42) 4 0 (1.28) 5A (1.75) 0 (1.43) 0 (0.54) 5
Confused 8 (17.98) 24 (17.09) 24A (15.03) 0 (5.89) 56 2 (12.29) 20 (16.79) 26A (13.71) 0 (5.2) 48
Negative 0 (9.63) 9 (9.16) 21 (8.05) 0 (3.16) 30 1 (5.89) 11 (8.04) 11 (6.57) 0 (2.49) 23
Don’t know 2 (7.38) 1 (7.02) 0 (6.17) 20 (2.42) 23 3 (6.15) 0 (8.39) 0 (6.86) 21 (2.6) 24
Total 61 58 51 20 190 52 71 58 22 203
b) ASD group
Emotion Positive 68A (43.68) 28 (40.91) 19 (28.75) 0 (1.66) 115 57A (31.06) 21 (29.62) 19 (34.4) 0 (1.91) 97
Pretend 0 (1.9) 3A (1.78) 2 (1.25) 0 (0.07) 5 0 (1.6) 4A (1.53) 1 (1.77) 0 (0.1) 5
Confused 6 (17.09) 23 (16.01) 16A (11.25) 0 (0.65) 45 7 (21.77) 26 (20.77) 34A (24.12) 1 (1.34) 68
Negative 2 (9.87) 12 (9.25) 12 (6.5) 0 (0.37) 26 0 (5.12) 6 (4.89) 10 (5.67) 0 (0.31) 16
Don’t know 3 (6.46) 8 (6.05) 3 (4.25) 3 (0.24) 17 1 (5.44) 5 (5.19) 8 (6.03) 3 (0.33) 17
Total 79 74 52 3 208 65 62 72 20 203
Note. Frequencies with subscript A denote correct gift and consistent emotion inference.
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incorrect Monopoly money or chocolate inferences
(F(2,31)51, P50.4).
Summary
In the static (compared to the dynamic) condition,
both groups made significantly more correct chocolate
inferences, but individuals with ASD gave significantly
less correct Monopoly money inferences. This is
reflected in the pattern of participants’ errors; partici-
pants with ASD could only distinguish reactions to
chocolate and homemade in the static condition, and
reactions to Monopoly money from chocolate and
homemade in the dynamic condition.
Are gift and emotion inferences consistent? A
similar analysis approach to Cassidy et al. (2014) is
adopted here. Likelihood ratios compare the observed
and expected frequencies of emotion labels participants
offered alongside their gift inference, for correct (3) and
incorrect (4) trials in each group and condition. Tables
3 and 4 show that typical controls (3/4a) and those
with ASD (3/4b) rate chocolate inferences as predomi-
nantly positive, Monopoly money as predominantly
confused, and higher than expected. Inconsistent gift
and emotion responses (e.g. positive for Monopoly
money) are lower than expected. Pretend emotion rat-
ings were rare, however, both groups ascribe this rating
to homemade gift inferences above the level expected.
Results showed that both groups gave significantly
more consistent and less inconsistent gift and emotion
inferences than predicted by the model, when the gift
inferred was correct in the static (Typical group,
Lv2(1)517.6, P<0.01; ASD group, Lv2(1)512.1,
P<0.01) and dynamic condition (Typical group,
Lv2(1)524.4, P<0.01; ASD group, Lv2(1)513.77,
P<0.01), or when the gift inferred was incorrect in the
static (Typical group, Lv2(1)513.85, P<0.01; ASD
group, Lv2(1)514.1, P<0.01) and dynamic condition
(Typical group, Lv2(1)515.8, P<0.01; ASD group,
Lv2(1)58.9, P<0.05).
Eye-Tracking Results
Analysis. Tobii Studio was used to define regions of
interest (ROIs) in the static condition as to the eyes,
mouth and body. In the dynamic condition, fixations
were visually coded as to the eyes, mouth or body by
the experimenter. Perusal of the raw eye-tracking data
showed loss of calibration (indicated by fixations made
outside of the eye-tracking area) was more prevalent in
the ASD group. To control for differences in calibration
quality between groups, ratios were calculated for atten-
tion to the eyes of the face (eye:mouth ratio5 eyes /
eyes1mouth) and to the face of the person (face:per-
son ratio5 eyes1mouth / eyes1mouth1body).
Higher values for the eye to mouth ratio denote a
greater proportion of fixations/duration of fixations on
the eyes of the face. Higher values for the face to person
ratio denote a greater proportion of fixations/duration
of fixations to the face of the person.
Visual fixation patterns in the static and
dynamic conditions. A three way mixed ANOVA
compared group as a between subjects factor with two
levels (ASD, typical control), condition as a within sub-
jects factor with two levels (static, dynamic) and ROI as
another within subjects factor with two levels (eye to
mouth ratio, face to body ratio), for the percentage
number/duration of fixations. Data were collapsed
across the three gifts as the pattern of results did not
significantly differ between gift types (Table 5).
For percentage number of fixations there was a signif-
icant main effect of condition; percentage number of
fixations to the eyes of the face and face of the person
were significantly higher in the dynamic (69.8%) than
the static (65%) condition (F(1,32)54.3, P50.046).
There was a significant main effect of ROI; proportion
of fixations were significantly higher to the face of the
person (89.3%) than the eyes of the face (45.2%;
F(1,32)5208, P<0.001). The interaction between con-
dition, ROI and diagnosis failed to reach significance
Table 5. Mean Percentage Fixation Count and Duration to the Eyes of the Mouth, and Face of the Person, for the ASD and
Typical Group, in the Static and Dynamic Condition Conditions
Dynamic condition Static condition
Mean (SD)
Eye to mouth ratio Face to person ratio Eye to mouth ratio Face to person ratio
a) Fixation count
Typical group 48.95 (23.89) 96.98 (1.91) 45.54 (23.48) 93.34 (4.8)
ASD group 42.23 (25.39) 91.04 (8.43) 44.02 (15.41) 76 (19.97)
b) Fixation duration
Typical group 47.9 (27.52) 97.64 (1.3) 42.13 (28.61) 97.31 (2.23)
ASD group 40.56 (28.4) 93.28 (8.72) 40.25 (19.39) 81.19 (20.4)
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(F(1,32)53.2, P50.08); those with ASD tended to be
less focused on the eyes of the face in the dynamic con-
dition, and to the face of the person in the static condi-
tion (Table 5). There was a marginally significant effect
of group; those with ASD were significantly less focused
on the eyes of the face and face of the person than con-
trols (ASD mean563.3%, control mean571.2%;
F(1,32)53.8, P50.058).
For proportion of fixation duration, there was a sig-
nificant main effect of ROI; proportion of fixation dura-
tion was significantly longer to the face of the person
(92.3%) than the eyes of the face (42.7%; F(1,32)5177,
P<0.001). The interaction between condition, ROI and
diagnosis failed to reach significance (F(1,32)53,
P50.09); those with ASD tended to spend less time
looking to the eyes of the face in the dynamic condi-
tion, and to the face of the person in the static condi-
tion (Table 5). Those with ASD did not spend
significantly less time looking to the eyes of the face,
and the face of the person than controls (ASD mean-
563.8%, control mean571.2%; F(1,32)52.6, P50.1).
Discussion
This study explored what underlies the emotion proc-
essing difficulties adolescents and adults with ASD expe-
rience in everyday life. Specifically, whether individuals
with ASD miss important cues from fast paced dynamic
stimuli, or alternatively, whether they have difficulty
interpreting emotion responses of low signal clarity.
Results showed that individuals with ASD were signifi-
cantly better able to distinguish who received a choco-
late or homemade gift when stimuli were static and
participants had time to peruse the stimuli for as long
as necessary, compared to when responses were
dynamic and fast paced. Unexpectedly, participants
with ASD were significantly less accurate when inferring
who received Monopoly money in the static (compared
to the dynamic) condition, and significantly less accu-
rate than controls, despite viewing the pictures for sig-
nificantly longer than typical controls. The pattern of
errors reflects this significant change in performance
between the two conditions. In the dynamic condition
participants with ASD were more likely to confuse reac-
tions to chocolate and homemade gifts but not
Monopoly money, similar to the results found in Cas-
sidy et al. (2014). However, in the static condition of
the current study, participants with ASD were more
likely to confuse reactions to Monopoly money with
reactions to a chocolate or homemade gift.
Both groups systematically attributed different emo-
tions to each gift in both conditions. This suggests (as
found in Cassidy et al., 2014) that both groups under-
stood what emotions were appropriate to each gift; gen-
uine positive for chocolate, feigned positive for
homemade and confused for Monopoly money. Hence,
differences in the pattern of performance between con-
ditions are most likely due to differences in ability to
recognise different emotion responses from static and
dynamic stimuli. In the ASD group, recognition of gen-
uine and feigned positive emotion responses improves
from static (relative to dynamic) stimuli, whereas recog-
nition of confused emotion responses is significantly
less accurate from static (relative to dynamic) stimuli.
An alternative explanation is that perhaps the indi-
viduals in the videos did not portray the expected emo-
tions for gift. For example, in the case of the
homemade gift, people may have felt genuinely posi-
tive in appreciation of the effort made. Furthermore,
given that spontaneous emotions tend to be mixed
(e.g. Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006), different emo-
tions may have appeared sequentially throughout the
video (e.g. initial confusion before a fake smile). This
variability could explain why chocolate and homemade
responses were confused more in the dynamic condi-
tion. Increased accuracy in the static condition could,
therefore, have resulted from reducing this variability,
by the researchers choosing a frame which best repre-
sented the emotion they expected to be consistent with
each gift. Hence, perhaps differences in performance
between conditions were not due to differences in abil-
ity to interpret emotion. Rather, the responses to each
gift were significantly more consistent with the
researcher’s expectations in the static, than the
dynamic condition.
If this were the case, then we would not expect emo-
tion inferences to be associated with correctly judging
what gift the person received. However, our results
(also see Cassidy et al., 2014) show that when partici-
pants correctly gauge what gift a person received (e.g.
homemade), they also systematically infer emotion
(feigned positive, as opposed to positive or confused).
The static stimuli chosen by the researchers were also
endorsed by independent judges blind to what gift the
person received. Hence, it is unlikely that the frame
chosen was biased by expectations of the researchers,
but rather a true representation of the peak of the emo-
tion portrayed in the videos. Therefore, differences in
performance across conditions in the ASD group, most
likely reflect differences in ability to infer different
emotions from static and dynamic stimuli.
Boraston et al. (2008) found that adults with ASD
had difficulty distinguishing genuine from feigned
smiles from static images, however, the images were
displayed briefly. In this study, the images were dis-
played for as long as participants needed to respond.
Eye-tracking studies have shown that adolescents and
adults with ASD show a delay, rather than an absence
of looking to pertinent social information (Fletcher-
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Watson et al., 2008, 2009; Freeth et al., 2010a,
2010b), which could particularly impact processing of
dynamic stimuli (Speer et al., 2007). Studies using
dynamic, as opposed to static stimuli also tend to
show more consistent differences in emotion process-
ing ability between individuals with and without ASD
(Roeyers et al., 2001), and when dynamic stimuli is
slowed, this improves emotion recognition perform-
ance in children with ASD (Gepner and Feron, 2009;
Tardif et al., 2007). Our findings that individuals with
ASD improve when interpreting genuine and feigned
positive emotion responses from static (compared to
dynamic) stimuli is consistent with these findings.
This suggests that individuals with ASD can interpret
subtle spontaneous emotion responses if given suffi-
cient time to process visual cues. This interpretation is
somewhat supported by our eye-tracking data, which
showed individuals with ASD looked (marginally) sig-
nificantly less to the person than controls in both
conditions, however, this group difference was not sig-
nificant for duration of fixations. Those with ASD also
tended to look less to the eyes of the face in the
dynamic (and not the static) condition, and less to
the face of the person in the static (and not the
dynamic) condition than controls, but this interaction
was not significant.
Freezing the emotion expressions significantly
reduced ability to interpret confused emotion responses
in the ASD group, suggesting that dynamic cues are
necessary for those with ASD to interpret these
responses. This is consistent with previous research
showing that dynamic cues help adults with ASD recog-
nise certain negative emotions such as anger (Enticott
et al., 2014). Negative emotions (e.g. fear, anger) tend
to reveal more consistent emotion recognition difficul-
ties in ASD (Adolphs et al., 2001; Corden et al., 2008;
Law Smith et al., 2010). This could be due to mixed
cues from the mouth and eyes. Emotion blends (e.g.
happy and surprised) also show subtle emotion recogni-
tion difficulties in ASD (Humphreys et al., 2007). People
tend to show mixed emotions spontaneously, such as
smiling in frustration (Hoque and Picard, 2011), and
happily or angrily surprised (Du, Tao, and Martinez,
2014). These mixed emotional responses are characteris-
tic of responses to Monopoly money, (e.g. smiling in
confusion). Thus, the static images of spontaneous con-
fused responses may not have had high enough signal
clarity for individuals with ASD to recognise, even
when given sufficient time to peruse these cues.
Another possibility for difficulties interpreting static
confused responses in participants with ASD could be
due to additional cues in the dynamic stimuli. For
example saying “OK, what for?” in response to
monopoly money, and “Thank you!” in response to a
chocolate or homemade gift. Cassidy et al. (2014) sug-
gested that individuals with ASD may rely more on
speech content when successfully distinguishing con-
fused responses from genuine and feigned positive
responses, whereas distinguishing genuine from
feigned positive responses requires integration of
speech content with inconsistent visual cues (saying
thank you with a fake smile). Previous research has
shown that adults with ASD rely more on speech con-
tent, rather than integrating nonverbal cues when
interpreting complex emotions from videos of social
interactions (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan,
2006). Adults with ASD are also less accurate when
distinguishing consistent from inconsistent facial and
vocal emotions (O’Connor, 2007), and children with
ASD are less susceptible to the McGurk effect, tending
to report the vocally produced syllable (Bebko,
Schroeder, & Weiss, 2014). This suggests difficulties
integrating multimodal cues, instead relying on verbal
cues. This could cause adults with ASD to misinterpret
complex emotions with inconsistent facial and vocal
cues.
In conclusion, this study is the first to explore what
underlies the emotion processing difficulties adoles-
cents and adults with ASD experience in everyday life.
Results demonstrate that the nature of the stimuli sig-
nificantly affects emotion processing in ASD. For
dynamic stimuli, adults with ASD tend to rely on
speech content, rather than integrating nonverbal
cues. When this speech content is absent in static
stimuli, adults with ASD are no longer able to interpret
mixed emotional responses, such as smiling in confu-
sion. This indicates difficulties interpreting emotions
of low signal clarity; in the case of dynamic stimuli
where visual and vocal cues may be inconsistent (say-
ing thank you with a fake smile), or a static picture of
a mixed emotional expression in the absence of
informative speech content (smiling in confusion).
However, adults with ASD can process subtle visual
cues distinguishing genuine from feigned smiles if
given time to peruse these. These subtle difficulties
cannot be revealed using static stimuli. Future studies
must explore what factors contribute to the emotion
processing difficulties adults with ASD experience
using real life social situations.
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